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In this paper, we seek to draw attention to the piloting stage of information systems (IS) in organizations. We argue that this 
stage has been neglected by IS scholars. To illustrate this argument, we draw on previous research and examine and review 
the pilot process across a number of studies undertaken with police forces in the United Kingdom. The studies reveal a 
different process of piloting than is outlined in the traditional IS and design literature. The findings indicate that results of the 
pilot (including laboratory and field measurements) are open to interpretation by organizational actors. We discuss the 
concept of legitimization of the technology being piloted and its role in the success of the pilot phase. 
Keywords  
Pilot, mobile, police, information systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we seek to examine a particular component of the innovation process, namely the process of piloting and, 
specifically, how the success of a pilot is interpreted. IS and innovation research acknowledges that IT adoption often 
includes a phase of initial “pilot testing” and that the trialability of an innovation at this stage affects adoption (Swanson 
1994), as well as future developments. Although it is a powerful and widely used tool (Pal et al. 2008), there are few studies 
that explore how pilot testing unfolds and the interaction between actors and the pilot technology (Bansler and Havn 2009). 
By exploring the work practices of actors as they form initial assessments of the technology and addressing how the 
properties of the technology are established, we aim to contribute further to the understanding of piloting as a critical phase 
of the innovation process, and emphasizing its strategic importance. 
We examine and review the pilot process across a number of studies illustrating our arguments with reference to a research 
program undertaken with police forces in the UK (Allen 2011; Allen and Karanasios 2011; Allen and Wilson 2004; Allen et 
al. 2008; Karanasios et al. 2009). The policing environment provides an interesting context for examining innovation as it is a 
highly politicised entity not amenable to radical change and particularly, failure and remains an area that has received 
relatively little enquiry. These pilots have strategic importance in the widespread diffusion of mobile devices in UK policing. 
While there is a developing literature that focuses on the implementation and use of mobile technologies within police 
services (Sørensen and Pica 2005; Straus et al. 2010) our aim is to illuminate the generic significance of the pilot and testing 
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stage in shaping the innovation rather than factors which are specific to the police. The findings discussed in this paper are 
useful for discussion, reflecting upon the importance of pilots and framing future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: PILOTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
In the wider innovation and change literature, piloting during the initial stage of innovation is seen as a significant part of the 
process (Chan and Hawkins 2012; Peraya et al. 2004), while testing and piloting in the IS field is often viewed as a rather 
uninteresting and unproblematic process (Gooding et al. 1989). There are  few insightful studies on the process and benefits 
of the pilot stage (Benbya and McKelvey 2006; Wiredu 2007). Piloting has been described as one element in the process of 
strategic experimentation as part of the innovation process. McKeen and Smith (2007 p. 136), for example, suggest that 
piloting is preceded by a process of idea generation and proof-of-concept (often undertaken within a laboratory environment) 
and followed by a transition stage where “the idea now enters the full system development life-cycle to ensure that the 
product/service is “industrial strength”. Many shortcuts (i.e., “duct tape” solutions) which served well enough for the pilot 
must now be engineered to meet production standards”.  
Some of the literature reviewed refer to the pilot phase as being undertaken within the laboratory using an experimental 
research design (c.f., Babar et al. 2006), while others see it as the first live trial of a technology in an organization or “real-
world” setting. Equally, piloting is often seen as part of the process of new systems development (invention) rather than 
deploying a new technology (innovation). The pilots reported in this paper are live trials of the mobile technologies by the 
police forces in their real world operational environments.  
Peraya et al., (2004) suggests that piloting innovation requires (i) the taking into account of an object in its complexity; (ii) 
the temporal dimension in which the project is grounded and develops; and, (iii) grounding on an approach in the centre of 
which are the actors, the negotiation and the making explicit of their practices, and how they make explicit to each other their 
practices. Schwabe and Krcmar (2000) note that pilots serve two key functions: to act as an exemplar of innovation and to 
test an innovation. In serving as a reference for other interested organizations, pilots can be used to demonstrate the benefit of 
the technology to end-users and enroll them into the technology development process. Of the two functions, the issue of 
testing or evaluation has been most intensively researched.  
The significant investment in IS coupled with low success rates (Doherty et al. 2011) provides a stark indicator of the need 
for evaluation and legitimization (Dougherty and Heller 1994) of innovations. It also raises the important issue of validation 
of a technology in the piloting stage. In the (ex-post) evaluation research, evaluation criteria are socially constructed (Bartis 
and Mitev 2008) and deeply political (Wilson and Howcroft 2005), with different stakeholders having different, and often 
conflicting, perceptions of IS (Walsham 1993), making them even more difficult to identify and measure (Markus 1983). 
These factors are also relevant in the pilot phase. Piloting and testing are important because what we know about the 
technology will have a major influence on how widely it is adopted and what we do with it (MacKenzie 1989). For 
organizations that fail to properly pilot technology there can be severe problems. Janson (1986) found that where the 
implementation of a software failed, applying a pilot system for selecting and implementing the software package would have 
resulted in identifying the causes of these failures. 
Pilots can be a useful way for organizations to examine the reaction of end-users as well as the overall fit of the innovation 
within the environment. Financially and politically, pilots can also be an instructive mechanism for an organization to justify 
decisions concerning whether to continue or halt investment in a particular innovation. As described by Dougherty and Heller 
(1994), the product innovation process in large, established, bureaucratic “big old firms” is often illegitimate because its 
constituent activities “either violate established practice or fall into a vacuum where no shared understandings exist to make 
them meaningful” (Dougherty et al. 1994). To successfully innovate, therefore, managers must legitimate this process by 
weaving “activities of product innovation into their institutionalized system of thought and action, not merely change 
structures or add values” (Dougherty et al. 1994). Therefore, it is unequivocal that much expectation can be placed on the 
outcomes of a pilot programme.  
In the context of policing, these expectations are problematized by political influences, public opinion and government 
mandates to adopt certain technologies (Ackroyd et al. 1992). Furthermore, police managers are often pressured by the need 
for quick results, the conviction that new technology can be beneficial and the desire to satisfy public opinion. For example, 
the case of the Yorkshire Ripper, prompted the development and use of a system, which emerged, in part, from the need of 
the UK government to be “seen as doing something” (Ackroyd et al. 1992). In other words, with significant ingenuity, any 
technology can be defended as adequate (MacKenzie 1989) or argued as meeting certain imperatives. It is this area, the 
perception of the pilots and technology, which generates the most interest in the literature. This is because technological 
testing is open to challenge, and the validity of the experimental procedure itself can be attacked in many ways (MacKenzie 
1989).  
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Technologies in the pilot phase, or as explained by Sterling (1995), the “goofy prototype” phase,  are seen as  rarely working 
well due to their experimental nature. This stage is also open to a range of factors such as the interpretive flexibility of 
stakeholders. That is, what is measured, and how it is interpreted by the different relevant groups. Therefore, while testing 
and piloting may be critical, the knowledge that testing generates, may be problematic (MacKenzie 1989). For instance, 
Bijker (1992) deconstructed the experiment of a UK National Health Service (NHS) clinical system and found that there were 
unusual circumstances surrounding the test (re-organization of the NHS) that prevented legitimate extrapolation of results to 
normal use conditions. In this case, unsuccessful results were being ameliorated by the argument of the impact of the re-
organization and thus actors argued that the system had all the right ingredients to succeed. At the same time, while there is a 
strong demand for controlled tests with careful monitoring and detailed information gathering, these are precisely the 
opposite conditions of a live scenario (MacKenzie 1989).  
More recently, Cornelissen (2011) discussed the use of analogies and metaphors as core processes for framing changes when 
evaluating and legitimating them. These analogies and metaphors serve to make the changes familiar and legitimate to the 
eyes of stakeholders. An understanding of how these processes can affect the outcome of the pilot phase could, therefore be 
crucial. Despite their consequences on innovation management and funding, these underlying issues are often not discussed, 
and remain omitted from contemporary IS research. 
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
The research is based on studies of three UK police forces that ran pilot implementations of mobile technologies. The 
research approach taken in these studies was of Action Research (Kock et al. 2008) where the research team attempted to 
develop “theory-in-practice based knowledge that is truly usable for IS practitioners” (Simonsen 2009 p.116). In these studies 
we blended both qualitative and quantitative approaches by working in partnership with internal police service data analysts 
and officers in a process of co-production. The approach to piloting observed was, however, one which was embedded in pre-
existing organizational processes ‘assumed as a norm’ and not influenced by the research team. In this paper the three sites 
will be referred to as Northern Force, Southern Force and Urban Force.  
Northern Force polices a large county area in the UK. The Force is regarded as a technology leader among UK Police Forces. 
They were early adopters of information and communication technologies (ICT) and, partly as a result of the lack of suitable 
commercially available systems; they have developed a very strong team in ICT. They ran a Mobile Data Pilot using PDAs. 
At the time of study the pilot had not been closed and this investigation was a snapshot of the implementation with data 
gathered over a limited (three month) time period. 
 
Southern Force polices a southern county area. The Force had established a project to look at the totality of changing the 
Force systems and processes, which took a systematic approach of marrying technological development to business 
processes. There were a few small pilots but these were limited in scope and scale while other major developments were 
being completed. Southern Force’s  pilot of PDAs, supports a set of processes that represent an evolution from earlier 
projects and is intended to inform future adoption and diffusion. Nonetheless, it has formed the basis of a larger and wider 
roll out.  
Urban Force is responsible for a large city that has extremes of both wealth and deprivation.  It is a large, well-resourced 
organization with a high-profile. They were involved in technology trials investigating the potential of mobile data as a 
means of delivering improvements in front line policing. An initial proof-of-concept provided neighborhood patrol officers 
with the opportunity to experiment with e-mail capable PDAs in one division of the force.  
Using the empirical results from the studies described above, we illustrate factors that pattern the pilot phase, focus on 
different types of measurements and the influences. The data we draw upon in the studies is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Force Summary of data collected 
Urban Qualitative data provided by the force on officer activity and system use. Baseline observation 
and semi-structured interviews with users of the technology. Data was collected before, 
immediately after live issue, at an interim point some three weeks later, and then as a final data 
collection exercise a month after the interim data collection. 
Northern Qualitative data both supplied directly by the Force and collected from interview and 
observation. Quantitative data was primarily drawn from in-Force data collection from existing 
systems and from specific requests and work by the Project Team. 
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Southern Qualitative data both supplied directly by the Force and collected from interview and 
observation. Quantitative data was lead by the Force and was been drawn from existing systems 
and specific requests and from work by the Project Team. 
Table 1: Summary of data collection 
DATA AND FINDINGS 
In each pilot, the device to be trialed had been developed in a partnership between a mobile technology device manufacturer, 
a mobile network provider and a specialist software development house. The hardware and interface design were developed 
for a commercial market and had already been taken through a development cycle by the device manufacturer. The software 
applications were (largely) developed from existing applications (either in-house or provided by an external vendor). The 
combination of software, hardware and communications network had been through initial proof-of-concept trials where the 
individual components of the system and the combination of the different components had been tested in a laboratory 
environment.  
Furthermore, financial benefits of the technology were more difficult to establish. Nonetheless, this is what holds the 
attention of policy makers, especially given the large amounts of government funding allocated to mobile devices. However, 
while some benefit areas could be represented in financial gains, it was not possible for all areas, and this is an area that 
should be treated with caution. In some cases the forces and the government body agreed on a basis for calculation and 
figures. In one case, this amounted to a saving of £7.7 million per annum. This was a non-cashable efficiency gain based on 
the ability of officers to complete administrative work on the beat, which would have kept officers in the station, reducing 
visibility and public reassurance.  
Other savings were measured in terms of improvements in police officer safety. In one case, this was evident through 
reducing attacks on police officers, while the technology could reduce the cost of absence due to illness or injury by over 
£7,000 per month. In other cases, the use of the pilot technology reduced the demand for voice communications (i.e. relying 
on the radio to contact the control room using costly spectrum). Such efficiency savings in administration in one case could 
allow jobs to be redeployed. To provide this number of additional staff by additional employment would cost in the order of 
£625,000. Nonetheless, during the pilots, we observed two areas of testing and measurement which we describe as “live” and 
“operational”, and which particularly inform our arguments.  
Live tests 
Live tests, where the technology is tested in a controlled laboratory setting, were undertaken in all three sites. Northern Force 
provides an exemplar of this, where the time taken using the piloted technology (PDA) in a given scenario was compared 
with using traditional radio, pen and notepad methods. The results provide empirical evidence of the advantages of the 
technology. The results indicate that the PDA offered time advantages over the extant process. For instance, the results of 
three scenarios conducted in a laboratory setting are displayed in Table 1. Nonetheless, while these tests examine the efficacy 
of the technology, it was recognized that these do not replicate the real conditions of using the technology on the beat. These 
‘live’ tests occurred both in parallel with and at the start of the pilot process.  
 
Scenario Total time taken on PDA Total time taken using paper 
notebook 
Scenario one: Fixed penalty ticket 8.35min 8.44min 
Scenario two: Two vehicle road crash 
with casualty and pedestrian witness 
30.00min 27.43min* 
Scenario three: Domestic assault 57.46min 70min 
Table 2: Laboratory test results from Northern Force 
*While the traditional method was faster, the process was not complete and still required some processing of data. 
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Operational measurements 
These refer to measurements in the operational environment. In the cases we examined, there was some consistency 
concerning the areas of operational measurement. However, this is not evidence of a successful pilot. At the same time, the 
approach used to assess each item varied (see table Table 2). Some measurements were qualitative relying on observations, 
interviews. Others where more quantitative, relying on questionnaires, economic analysis and comparison of figures against 
baseline data. Some items in the table were measured using both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
 
Measure Southern Force Northern Force Urban Force 
Visibility X X X 
Time out of station X X X 
Productivity X   
Access to Force and National applications X   
Public confidence in individual officers and Police X X X 
Detections X   
Officer safety X X X 
Process time for transactions supported by the PDA X   
Accurate form completion X   
Completeness of data X   
Airwave radio use X X X 
Load on control room staff X  X 
Back office process X  X 
Data quality of information received by officers  X  
Data quality of information input  X  
Ability to identify individuals  X  
Officer confidence  X  
Community contact, victim and witness support  X  
Mileage  X  
Smoothing of peaks and troughs in work   X 
Table 3: Example of operation benefits 
 
It is worth noting here that, before the technology was taken to pilot, it had significant organizational support and was 
perceived as being robust and fitting a particular work context. The view of those involved in the pilot was that it is a 
precursor to implementation, where ‘tweaks’ to the system may occur but major changes would be unlikely. As observed, the 
development and implementation of a technology is open to the interpretation of the results of the pilot. It is therefore 
important to not only examine what is measured, but also, how it is interpreted. The result of any test, need not, on its own, 
be held to determine, the workability of a technology, as different interpretations can be and are offered (Pinch et al. 1992). 
We explore how these interpretations are legitimized through the use of language in the discussion section. 
DISCUSSION 
McKeen and Smith (2007) describe the pilot stage as being followed by a transition stage and preceded by a proof-of-
concept. It is suggested that the pilot may generate ‘duct-tape’ solutions which are not ‘industrial strength’, which are then 
improved in a transition stage. In all three cases, the proof-of-concept stage seems to be much more developed than described 
Allen et al.  Understanding the role of information systems pilots 
 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 6 
 
and the transition stage seems to be incorporated within the pilot. The relatively conservative approach to piloting within the 
three organizations provides a contrast with the approach described by McKeen and Smith (2007). This approach perhaps 
reflects the nature of work undertaken by high reliability organizations’ (Young 2011) such as police forces where failure of 
systems piloted could lead to catastrophic consequences.  
Equally the distinction made between proof-of-concept and pilot stages in terms of laboratory vs. field trials seems less clear. 
In the cases that we observed the technology was placed in the laboratory environment for testing both at the start of the pilot 
and during the pilot (as seen in Table 2). These tests were focused on specific applications and on quantitative testing against 
objective criteria (such as time taken to undertake a particular procedure).   
However, as shown in Table 3, in terms of the operational measurements, the research demonstrates that the pilots focused 
more on features of the operational environment, than on the technology itself. At the same time, there were some areas of 
congruency of measurements across the three organizations. The technology “fit” or appropriateness was demonstrated, 
therefore, in both the laboratory setting and in the operational sense. The language of the operational measurements is also of 
interest because it draws on the discourse and norms of the police force rather than technological or economic terminology. 
Discrepancies in the range of measurements are also instructive as some items are measured whilst others are not. We 
observed that what is measured often depends on the context, the scope of the technology and the objectives of the force. 
However, there are political elements as well. For instance, “increased detections” may seem like an obvious unit of 
measurement, and one that is easily measured. But this measurement is also predisposed to a range of extraneous factors such 
as major events that may impact on the number of arrests (such as a riot). In some cases, double-crewed teams of officers 
would consist of one user of the pilot technology (i.e. mobile device) and one non-user, further contaminating the potential 
for clear measure of detections. Furthermore, it is also dependent on the nature of the police force, because some police 
forces are statistics based, meaning that they measure output based on number of detections. This is an ambiguous 
measurement, as arresting citizens for a minor infringement does not necessarily signify an increase in public safety or 
efficiency. On the other hand, other police forces may rely on “time to solve a crime” as a measurement of efficiency.  
Other measurements appear less acquiescent to evaluate, such as “police officer safety”, especially given that its 
determination is based on observations and opinions of the officers. Nevertheless, in an environment where perceived officer 
safety is important, it stands as a valid measurement for the justification of the technology. Quantitatively, officer safety can 
in principle be measured by number of attacks on the officer. However, this can be construed, because the devices allow 
officers to identify criminals with greater ease. In other words, the greater the number of criminals identified, the more likely 
an attack. This shows that the data extrapolated is open to a range of different interpretations which may be used by 
stakeholders to legitimize the technology.. 
In our study, from the stage of conception, technologies needed to be legitimized, in order for them to progress to the position 
of testing. The legitimization process involved negotiating for initial funding within the force (Ackroyd et al. 1992). 
Legitimization of change involves the use of analogies or metaphors (Cornelissen et al. 2011; Dougherty et al. 1994). As core 
processes of framing, these make the change appear familiar and legitimate in the eyes of stakeholders (Cornelissen et al. 
2011). This is important in the context of the public sector, and especially the police, where misused and wasted funding is 
viewed critically. The legitimization process involves “selling the technology” and moving beyond conceptual and design 
stages into establishing an artifact that can be adapted and measured under controlled and “live” conditions.  
In the legitimization process, technologies are often made available through texts, and the meaning given to a technology 
though such texts varies from one context to another (Pinch et al. 1992). For change to be accepted as legitimate, it has to be 
framed in a persuasive manner that is “culturally familiar to stakeholders” and “captures salient and related aspects of the 
change” (Cornelissen et al. 2011). This is crucial in the pilot phase and the language used can often influence the decision to 
proceed or abstain. If mobile technology was presented from the perspective of a mechanism to reduce costs by decreasing 
police officer numbers it is likely to meet hostility. On the other hand, if the technology is marketed through the language of 
efficiency, accountability, and increased visibility, then it is more likely to resonate with the public sector decision makers.  
This is a particularly important issue, and despite the level of interest surrounding mobile devices in policing, economic terms 
like “cost-cutting” and “reduction of staff” were not used to legitimize the action of the pilots. Rather, less audible objectives 
were set such as increasing public reassurance by increasing the amount of time officers spent on the beat, efficacy in major 
incidents and operational efficiencies. This sets the scene where, rather than investigate financial gains, the pilots were 
interested in operational and public benefits. An important component of the legitimization process was that the forces were 
required to gain funding in order to support pilots involving a formal relationship between police forces and the government 
bodies. 
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CONCLUSION 
Piloting of IS is a key element of the innovation and implementation processes. However, it is also one which is neglected in 
IS research. This research suggests a different process from the one described in the literature; one where a more robust 
technology is piloted (closer to the end product) and one which is not followed by a transition stage to full implementation, 
but (if successful) is seen as a first roll out of the system. Equally we also point to the importance of laboratory (or live) tests 
before and during the pilot not just within the proof-of-concept stage. While much of the research focuses on the significance 
of pilots in the evaluation process our work also illuminates the importance of the pilot as a mechanism for demonstration 
and legitimization. Given the paucity of research on this topic, it is unclear whether our findings are applicable more 
generally, or whether they only reflect the nature of the technology (mobile solutions) and the nature of the environment in 
which the technology is being deployed (i.e., high reliability organizations where systems failure could have catastrophic 
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